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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Respondents have now settled on an implied trust 
theory-but they themselves confuse their own theory 
by saying (Respondents' Brief, pages 5 and 15) that 
Xettie Miller could not dispose of the property in ques-
tion by will. There is absolutely no restriction of any 
kind on Nettie in Miles' will. In any event, if she was a 
trustee, she necessarily would have to have had power 
to dispose of the property by sprinkling it among the 
purported beneficiaries. This demonstrates clearly the 
~onfusion, ambiguities and conjectures which respond-
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ent:::; now wish to write into the will. We call attention 
to the 8irnpl(' language of Paragraph ~econd of the \\ill 
(R. 45 and Appellants' Brief, (p. 3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE WILL MUST BE CONSTRUED FROM ITS TERMS, 
AND CLARITY AND CERTAINTY MUST PREY AIL OVER 
AMBIGUITIES, UNCERTAINTY AND PURE GUESS. 
'rhe law of wills and of probate is premised on tlw 
need for clarity, certainty and definiteness of terms. 
'rhe only rights under the law of wills are those given 
by statute. In re Mower, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 96i: 
Thompson on Wills, Sec. 8, p. 18. The instrument as ex-
ecuted is the ultimate criterion-not conjectures as to 
what a testator, now long deceased, might have wanted 
or might have said, if we could now read his mind and 
rewrite his will. See 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, Sec. 
5.11, p. 187. 
Our Court in In re Gall's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386 
P. 2d 10G5, weighed the applicable statutes and held in 
favor of the clear, certain and explicit. Respondents ask 
that the Call case be reversed. 
Respondents have said (Respondents' Brief, p. 14) 
that ''Not only testator's words, but his lack of words 
have a bearing upon ·what he had in mind when he signed 
the instrument." We submit that the words of the will 
an~ all that is in question. The will has no limitation upon 
Nettie a:,; to any disposition by will or deed, and therr 
3 
is no Pxpression of her right to use the property for 
lwr own benefit, as suggl•sted by respondents. Nettie re-
e<'ived a devise of the entire residue, followed by words of 
r/011/Jtful import. By the Call case, the clear devise was 
paramount over any subsequ8nt ambiguous and equivocal 
language which might conjure up thoughts or possible 
intentions of the testator, if we could now read his mind. 
'l'lw Call case spelled out the importance of certainty 
and showed that in a choice between the application of a 
general statute, namely, 7-1-2-1, UCA 1953, going to the 
te.stator's general intent, and a specific statute, 74-1-36, 
UCA 1953, determining and favoring a fee simple devise, 
the latter, which makes for clarity and certainty, must 
prevail. 
The same choice, applied to the Miles Miller will, 
under all existing law, can only be made in favor of an 
unqualified fee simple devise to Nettie. 
The rule of the Call case is restated in Thompson on 
Wills, Sec. 224, p. 350, as follows: 
"An absolute devise or bequest of property 
in one clause of a will can not be qualified or cut 
down by a later part of the will unless such later 
part shows an equally clear intention to do so by 
the use of words definite in their meaning or by 
expressions which must be regarded as impera-
tive. 
"When an estate or interest is given in one 
clause of a will by clear and specific terms, it can 
not be cut down or taken away by raising a doubt 
upon the extent and meaning of other clauses, 
but only by equally clear and decisive words as 
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those by which the estate or interest affected was 
created, or l>y dear and undoubted implication 
from the language used." 
POINT II. 
THE PROBATE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
THE EST ATE UPON APPOINTMENT OF THE EXECUTRIX 
AND COULD DETERMINE AND ADJUDICATE THE RES 
BY ITS SUBSEQUENT DECREES. 
The respondents compound their own dilemma and 
confusion in their Second Point entitled "The Decree 
of Distribution is in accordance with the Terms of the 
·will and does not cut off the Interests of Respondents," 
by their following argument that the decree deprived re-
spondents of rights because of failure of due process for 
the reason that no notice was given to respondents on the 
petition for distribution, and that the decree was a nullity. 
The Decree of Distribution in the simplest language 
gave the entire residue of l\Iiles' estate to Nettie. The will 
merged into the de>cree, and the decree became final when 
not appealed from. 
Respondents are squarely confronted in their argu-
ment as to ineffectiveness of the decree because of lack 
of notice by a Utah statute and two landmark Utah case1 
that have weathered the test of 56 years before thii 
Court. 
75-1-7, UCA 1953 is entitled "Jnrisdiction properly 
acquired, irregularities do not invalidate subseque11I 
orders wul decrees," and it provides first as to partiro 
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dai!lling adnnwly to th(· title of the decedent, and then 
as fol lows: 
.. . . and in a probate matter in which a 
competent court shall have appointed an executor, 
administrator or guardian upon due notice, no 
objection to any subsequent order or decree there-
in can be taken by any person claiming under the 
dPeeased or under the ward, on account of any 
~rnch want of noticP, defect or irregularity, in any 
otlwr manner than on direct application to the 
same court, made at any time before distribution 
or on appeal." 
Rarrl'ltc i:. Whitue.IJ, 3G Utah 574, 106 P. 522, 37 
L.R.A. ( N .S.) 3G8, tested this statute, and our Court 
lwld that probate proceedings are in rem; that the court 
acquires jurisdiction of the property of the estate and 
of all persons who have any interest in the property by 
propt>r notice given on the appointment of the executor; 
and that other notices provided for are not jurisdictional, 
and disregard therefor is a mere irregularity and may 
lw assailed, in absence of fraud, only in direct proceed-
ings. Failure to give notice of final distribution was held 
not to affect the validity of the decree of distribution, 
except on direct proceedings. See 21 Am. Jur., Sec. 12, 
p. 377, where the proposition is stated as a universal rule 
that probate is a matter in rem, with jurisdiction had 
ov0r tlw Pstate of decedent as the subject matter after 
notice properly given on appointment of the executor. 
Bancroft Probate Practice (2nd Ed.), Sec. 40, p. 107, 
statPs thP rule as follows: 
''A proceeding for the probate of a will or 
for thP grant of letters of administration, is thus 
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in the nature of a proceeding in rem, with th~ 
court obtaining jurisdiction of the real and per-
sonal estate of the deceased upon the appointment 
of an executor or administrator ... A judgrnent 
in probate is not against the persons as such, 
but against or upon the thing or subject matter 
itself, the status or condition of which is to be 
determined. When rendered, the judgment is a 
solemn declaration of the status of the thing, 
ipso facto rendering it what it is declared to he. 
"Where statutory notice has been given, all 
who are interested in the estate, and, in fact all 
the world, are bound by all orders or decrees duly 
entered." 
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 Utah 
181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1119, confirmed the Barrette 
case and laid to rest the question of jurisdictional notiee 
in probate in Utah. 
Respondents argue that title vested on death of the 
testator. This is true, subject to administration and to 
adjudication and delineation of that title by the court 
by its subsequent decree. Bancroft Probate Practice (2na 
Ed.), Sec. 7, p. 17, states: 
"Probate of wills is essential to the establish· 
rnent of a record title in the beneficiaries, both 8.\ 
to real and personal property." 
In Kennedy's Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 795, 197 P.2a 
8-:U, the California Court held that title vests subject tii 
administration and that the estate passes into the cu8tody 
of the state to be by its agencies and instrumentalitie; 
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111anaged until crf'ditors an• paid and the rights of de-
vis(.'PS and h\'il's are established. That court said: 
"While it re1JOses in such custody the court 
is autlwrizf'd to dett•nnine the validft~- of wills 
and of creditors' claims, the rights of rival heirs, 
th<> nPcessity of sales and other incidents of wind-
ing up an estate." 
SP<~ 21 Am. Jur., Sec. 487, p. 653. 
Our Court in Nelson v. Howells, 75 Utah 461, 286 P. 
G:ll, has hPld that the decree of distribution is the inter-
pretation of the will. 
Showing the practical application of the Barrette 
case and '75-1-7, uCA 1953, Title Standard No. 58 as 
adopted by the Utah State Bar requires abstracting of 
the proof of notice on the petition for letters testament-
ary and of the recording of the decrel~ of distribution. 
~o othPr proof of notice on petitions subsequent to that 
for appointment of the executor is required. 
Jurisdiction was had over the notice properly given 
on appointmf'nt of Nettie l\Iiller as executrix (R. 44). 
The probate court thereafter adjudicated and determined 
the titlP of the decedent by its decree of distribution. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents are in fact and m effect asking 
1·ewrsal of two landmark df'cisions of this Court, a re-
peal of li'l-1-7, UCA 1953, and a complete reversal of the 
m rem theory of probate. 
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We submit that the Probate Court had jurisdiction 
over the Miller estate. Its decree of distribution was the 
interpretation of th<> will, which merged into the decree. 
The decree was final and not subject to collateral attaek. 
'l'he judgment of the District Court should be re· 
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS, JR. 
416 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
